AS GOVERNMENTAL UNITS-federal, state, county and local-expand their payments for drugs and medical supplies, they tend increasingly to want to control their costs. This is accomplished by various means. For example, the federal government's Defense Personnel Support Center procures drugs for the Department of Defense utilizing an elaborate system of inspections of manufacturing plants followed by assay of laboratory samples prior to the award of the contract. This system tends to assure that contracts are awarded only to those manufacturers with the trained personnel, equipment and control procedures capable of producing quality drugs in a proper environment. In surveys over the past five years, it has found that about 50 percent of its preaward inspections resulted in the disqualification of manufacturing plants because of deficiencies in either their control procedures or housekeeping. More surprising, about 50 percent of these plants which passed the inspection failed to submit acceptable pre-award laboratory samples for testing. These results indicate how important an inspection and testing program is when drugs are purchased under their nonproprietary names. This system is costly to administer and its use is feasible only under certain conditions such as when large quantities of drugs are purchased for controlled distribution.
Hospitals procure drugs under systems that seldom involve plant inspections or analysis or testing of the drug product; rather, they rely upon the integrity of the producer. Thus, proper specifications and control of acceptable sources of supply are important when drugs are procured under a bid system. Although even the best drug manufacturers will have products recalled from time to time because they lack potency or have a labeling or other error, this happens seldom enough to give everyone a feeling of security when drugs are purchased from companies which have established a reputation for producing quality drug products. This system is also quite effective in procuring quality drugs and again, it can be used only when the distribution points are limited such as a single hospital or a group of hospitals.
A third system is that used by many health and welfare agencies which attempt to control the price of drugs by placing a ceiling on the amount they will pay for certain drugs contained in their "formulary," 1 often ignoring completely the reliability of the source of supply or the quality of the drug product. Needless to say, this system is poor and meets resistance from physicians, pharmacists and some patients. Here the central problem is that we have a large number of community pharmacist distributors each of whom purchases varying quantities of drugs independently under uncontrolled conditions for use in filling welfare and other prescriptions.
Many countries have solved this dilemma by arriving Drug Intelligence and Clinical Pharmacy VOL 5 by D O N E. FBANCKE at prices to be charged to the public after negotiation between representatives of pharmacists and governmental authorities. In turn, the government has negotiated prices the pharmacist may be charged for the drug product by the producer. The Drug Tariff which results from negotiation between the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain and the Ministry of Health is an example of a document controlling the price of drugs to the public. For the control of cost of drugs to the pharmacist, the British Health Ministry has established a Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme with the pharmaceutical industry which permits the negotiation of a percentage profit which will vary with many different circumstances and considerations. 2 The scheme is flexible and the pharmaceutical industry in Great Britain has flourished under it. Without becoming a public utility, the industry submits to voluntary price controls.
The greatest advantage of these price controlling plans is that the public is represented and, therefore, feels that its interests are protected. At the same time a professional fee and other items of remuneration and reimbursement can be worked into the formula for compensating the pharmacist, based on the level of pharmaceutical service he gives. Perhaps a capitation fee for each person registered with a community pharmacy could be paid in addition to the fee for each prescription as is done in The Netherlands. 3 The American public has come to equate quality of pharmacy service almost solely with the price of the drug product. Many pharmacists have encouraged this. Others who want to give a more comprehensive public health service are discouraged by competition from offering it because their profit is too closely related to the cost of the drug. In addition, there has been for yearsjustified or not-a public clamor about the excessive cost of drugs to the public and the high profits of the pharmaceutical industry.
As pressures for an American national health service continue to mount, it is inevitable that the public be represented in any program to control the cost of drugs. Drug prices have been negotiated in many countries and represent, it seems to me, a method far superior to that practiced by many welfare agencies of placing an arbitrary ceiling on them regardless of their source or quality. Although negotiation of drug prices is a complex procedure possessing many difficulties, it is well worth serious consideration.
